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The national welfare state, so it seems, has come under attack by European integration. This 
article focuses on one facet of the welfare state, that is, health care and on one specific 
dimension, that is, cross-border movement of patients. The institution which has played a 
pivotal role in the development of the framework regulating the migration of patients is the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Court’s activity in this sensitive area has not remained 
without critics. This was even more so since the Court invoked Treaty (primary) law which 
not only has made it difficult to overturn case law but also has left the legislator with very 
little room for manoeuvre in relation to any future (secondary) EU law. What is therefore of 
special interest in terms of legitimacy is the legal reasoning by which the Court has made its 
contribution to the development of this framework. This article is a re-appraisal of the legal 
development in this field.  
Health care, solidarity, ECJ, free movement of services 
 
Boundaries are of pivotal importance when it comes to health care systems. They are 
necessary because partial solidarity,2 which forms the basis of the welfare state, requires 
boundaries.3 If boundaries are essential for the functioning of the welfare state, then the 
connection between the welfare state and nation state only becomes obvious because with the 
advent of the nation state, societies have been transformed into highly bounded entities.4 The 
range of impact the health care framework of the EU can have on boundaries reaches from 
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making them more permeable which means that the individual health care systems become 
coordinated to integration which means that boundaries are dissolved or redrawn.5  
Generally it seems fair to say that patients wish to exit their system of affiliation 
predominately for two reasons: first, they prefer to have access to the treatment they need as 
quickly as possible; I will call this the ‘vector of time’. Secondly, patients hope for better 
treatment which can either mean that the same treatment is performed more skilfully 
elsewhere or patients seek to gain access to treatment which is not even available in their 
system of affiliation; I will refer to this as the ‘vector of treatment’. It is therefore of no 
coincidence that the authorisation regime of the EU, which regulates the terms and conditions 
when patients become allowed to exit their system of affiliation, focuses on the above 
mentioned vectors of ‘time’ and ‘treatment’. In particular, secondary EU law and here most 
notably, Article 20 of Regulation No 883/2004,6 gives a rather detailed account of the two 
vectors as will be outlined below.   
The Court, beginning implicitly with Luisi and Carbone7 and explicitly continued in 
the seminal case of Kohll8 decided to link health care with free movement of services (Article 
56 et seq. TFEU). This move by the Court turned out to be rather ‘controversial’9. The Court, 
has been criticised on various occasions for its ‘activism’, especially in relation to its 
interpretation of Treaty provisions.10 However, activism in relation to the Treaty is a 
particularly sensitive matter because it is relatively easy for the Court to transform itself into 
an agenda setter which is capable of limiting options available not only for the national but 
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also the EU legislator.11 The most recent evidence in this regard is Directive 2011/24 which 
regulates the rights of patients in cross-border health care. The EU legislator – as a 
consequence of the Court’s case law – was de facto left with only limited choices to make.12 
These considerations award a reappraisal of the existing case law. 
The aim of this article is to give a reconstructive account regarding the legitimacy of 
the Court’s case law in the field of patient migration. In contrast to the existing literature this 
article seeks to justify the use of primary EU law in the field of health care by making 
reference to secondary EU health care law, that is, most notably Article 20 Regulation 
883/2004. Conceptually this approach is based on Dworkin’s idea which treats law as 
integrity. Briefly stated, respecting the integrity of law requires one to look back in history in 
order to establish whether principles have been applied consistently over time. This will be 
the focus of section 1 of this article. Yet integrity in law also makes it necessary to ‘look 
across’ in order to study whether principles are established consistently across the law. This 
will be the focus of sections 2 and 3.13 Law as integrity means that every judge interprets the 
law in accordance with its best possible reading.14 
 
1. The Meaning of Free Movement of Services 
 
                                                 
11 M Dougan, ‘The Bubble that Burst: Exploring the Legitimacy of the Case Law on the Free Movement of 
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12 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the Application of 
Patient’s Rights in Cross-Border Health Care [2011] O.J. L88/45. 
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In order to establish whether health care constitutes a service in accordance with the Treaty 
the starting point is Article 57 TFEU which stipulates that ‘[s]ervices shall be considered to 
be “services” within the meaning of the Treaties where they are normally provided for 
remuneration.’ In legal positivist thinking the provision clearly constitutes an example of 
‘open texture’, that is, one finds ‘duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt’.15 
The existence of doubt is also evidenced by the disagreement which is usually rare to find 
between the Court and its Advocate Generals. Yet it surfaced on the question as to whether 
free movement of services ought to be applicable in relation to health care. The two Advocate 
Generals developed their (dissenting) arguments in the light of the Court’s (earlier) case law 
in the field of education. Such mutual references are plausible because health care and 
education are both public services for which ‘many of the same arguments apply’.16 Yet in 
Humbel17 the Court had found that education does not constitute a service which is provided 
for remuneration, whereas in health care the Court arrived at the opposite conclusion.  
Two preliminary observations can be made about the relationship between education 
and health care. First, and based on the involvement of solidarity, Somek argues that the 
Court should have pursued the same approach it had chosen in public education and decided 
that health care is beyond the reach of the Treaty.18 This is in line with Hervey who considers 
solidarity to be ‘a buttress against market law’.19 Second, Shuibhne argues that the two 
strands of case law are not only conflicting but evidence of the Court’s ‘incompleteness of 
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reasoning and the selective citation of existing authority.’20 If her finding is persuasive this 
presents a serious problem for the Court because legal reasoning and legitimacy are 
interconnected.21 It is therefore necessary to examine whether a plausible argument can be 
made which allows for treating health care and education differently or, alternatively, 
whether it must be concluded that one was decided wrongly. One can argue that judges are 
faced with hard cases when it comes to health care.  
 
INTERPRETATION THROUGH TEXTUALISM 
The story of cross-border movement begins – as is well known – with Mr Kohll’s daughter 
who was insured in Luxembourg but had received dental treatment by an orthodontist 
established in Germany. In line with Luxembourg national law but also Article 22 of 
Regulation No 1408/71 Mr Kohll had asked for prior authorisation from the competent 
national authority but was denied on grounds that his daughter’s dental treatment was neither 
urgent (vector of time) nor unavailable (vector of treatment) in Luxembourg. However, the 
legal journey did not end there. Advocate General Tesauro considered ‘medical activities’ to 
constitute a service in accordance with Article 57 TFEU.22  
When the case reached the ECJ it found without offering further justification that the 
treatment by the German dentist constituted a service in accordance with the Treaty.23 The 
consequence of this ruling was that health care treatment, more specifically non-hospital 
treatment, became part of free movement law. It is submitted that the character of legal 
                                                 
20 N N Shuibhne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law. Constitutional Responsibility and the Court of 
Justice (Oxford University Press 2013) 66. 
21 Cf. G Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (Hart 2012) 92-95. 
22 A.G. Tesauro, Cases C-120/95 (Decker) and C-158/96 (Kohll), EU:C:1997:399, paras 15-25. 
23 Kohll, op. cit. supra note 8, para 29. 
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reasoning applied by the Court and its Advocate Generals can be best categorised as 
textualism. According to US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, one of its chief 
proponents, the core characteristic of this method is that ‘[t]he text is the law, and it is the text 
that must be observed.’24 
Yet the consensus between the Court and its Advocate Generals that had still existed 
in Kohll came to an abrupt end with the subsequent cases of Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms25 
and Vanbraekel.26 Judgments for both cases were delivered on the same day. Despite some 
factual changes about the way treatment was delivered in Kohll – hospital treatment instead 
of non-hospital treatment, and the organisation of the system, benefits in kind instead of 
reimbursement – the basic question remained the same, namely whether services offered by 
public health care systems are provided for remuneration? The Court – in both cases – only 
made brief reference to the ‘settled case law’ of Luisi and Carbone and Kohll before it found, 
without hesitating, that medical services would fall indeed under the provisions of free 
movement of services.27 The Court simply argued that the mere fact that fees are pre-set and 
paid by a third party, i.e. the public insurance system, does not rule out the application of 
Article 57 TFEU.28  
In contrast to the Court, Advocate General Saggio in his Opinion in Vanbraekel found 
‘that services which, on the one hand, are an integral part of the public health-care system, in 
the sense that they are established and organised by the State, and, on the other hand, are 
financed by public funds, must be excluded from the provisions on freedom of movement’.29 
The same conclusion was reached by Advocate General Colomer in Geraets-Smits and 
                                                 
24 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton University Press 1997) 22.  
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Peerbooms,30 who also highlighted the organisational differences between the Luxembourg 
health care system in Kohll and the Dutch system in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms. The 
Advocate General concluded that only the Dutch system is ‘free for insured persons’.31 The 
reasoning of the Advocate General, arguably, was inspired by the earlier case law on 
education. In the earlier case of Gravier, Advocate General Slynn had already addressed the 
question of whether education could possibly constitute a service which falls under the 
umbrella of the Treaty.  
The Advocate General thought that education could amount to ‘economic activities’32 
which were then to be governed by Article 57 TFEU. At the same time he also found that in 
the specific case of state education this was not the case because its aim was not to make 
economic profit. The Advocate General argued instead, that education forms part of the 
social policy of the state which covers all or most of its costs.33 In the later (education) case 
of Humbel the Court endorsed the reasoning of Advocate General Slynn albeit with a slightly 
further developed definition about the meaning of ‘remuneration’. For a service to be covered 
by the law on free movement of services, according to the Court, the service must, first, 
engage ‘in gainful activity’, secondly must not simply be the fulfilment of duties which a state 
has in relation to its own people and thirdly, must not be ‘funded from the public purse’.34 
Applying these criteria in the context of public education the Court concluded that education 
did not constitute a service which is provided for remuneration.35  
The important question which then needs to be addressed is whether these criteria, 
developed in the field of education, are at all helpful and can be meaningfully translated into 
                                                 
30 A.G. Colomer, Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, EU:C:2000:274, para 33. 
31 Ibid., paras 25 (emphasis added); a rather similar argument was made in Case C-372/04 Watts, 
EU:C:2006:325 which originated from the English National Health Service (NHS). 
32 A.G. Slynn, C-293/83 Gravier, EU:C:1985:69, 602. 
33 Ibid., 603. 
34 Humbel, op. cit. supra note 17, para 18 (emphasis added). 
35 Ibid., para 20. 
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the area of health care. The ‘profit-argument’, invoked by the Court, generally does not seem 
particularly useful in order to determine whether a respective service is provided for 
remuneration. Even in competition law, where the identification of economic activity is 
essential, the marker of ‘profit-making’ is absent.36 Also, it appears that the Court in the 
meantime has forgone of the profit argument altogether because it has been absent in the 
Court’s later case law on education.37 In addition, the ‘duty-argument’, which was also 
mentioned by the Court, does not necessarily constitute a helpful marker either because all 
actions of a state, as Davies rightly points out, are – one way or another – a fulfilment of its 
duties.38  
For a ‘transaction’ to be commercial, arguably, it is necessary that payer and recipient 
of the service are sufficiently distinct. This is not necessarily the case if ‘[t]he payer and the 
provider are essentially working together to provide a single service, rather than exchanging 
that service for money.’39 In order to illustrate this point Davies uses state universities as an 
example which most likely are organised as part of the Ministry of Education.40 The overall 
problem with this argument, which is based on ‘separateness’ of entities, is that it appears to 
operate less with absolute but more relative categories. This naturally begs the question: how 
much separateness is needed or what is considered to be too close? Closely related with 
transaction is the ‘funding-argument’. 
It is this argument which seems conceptually most closely connected to 
‘remuneration’. For this reason alone, it is presumably the most interesting and promising 
one. Consequently, it deserves to be addressed in more detail. Davies undertakes an elaborate 
                                                 
36 G Davies, ‘Welfare as a Service’, 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2002) 27, 29-30.  
37 Case C-76/05 Schwarz, EU:C:2007:492, para 39. 
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attempt to conceptually distinguish education from health care depending on how funding is 
organised. With an emphasis on the transaction aspect, Davies argues that a service is 
provided for remuneration when a private insurance company pays for a hospital but also if, 
for example, the state pays a private company in order to provide a specific service. Under 
these circumstances a service will undoubtedly be offered for remuneration. Also, a service is 
provided for remuneration when the state specifically ‘sells’ this service to the public.41  
In the context of health care we find a specific version of the transaction problem. In 
the English case of Watts,42 the Court found – in line with its earlier case law – free 
movement law to be applicable; the English National Health Service (NHS) is tax funded and 
delivers its services free of charge.43 The Court in its legal reasoning in Watts focussed 
exclusively on the cross-border dimension of the transaction, that is, a patient pays a health 
care provider directly in another Member State and is then reimbursed by the system of 
affiliation.44 In other words, the private individual is reimbursed by the state. This in turn 
allowed the Court to come to the conclusion that there was no need in the case of Watts ‘to 
determine whether the provision of hospital treatment in the context of a national health 
service such as the NHS is in itself a service within the meaning of those provisions’.45 
Accordingly, Spaventa accuses the Court of using a ‘hermeneutic “trick”.’46 Watts clearly 
shows that attempts of conceptualising the Court’s case law along the lines of textualism does 
                                                 
41 G Davies, ‘The Process and Side-Effects of Harmonisation of European Welfare States’ (2006) Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No 02/06 (2006) 17. 
42 The case of Watts was about an English patient who jumped the NHS waiting lists and went to France in order 
to receive a hip replacement. 
43 On the organisation of the NHS see C Newdick, Who Should We Treat? Rights, Rationing, and Resources in 
the NHS, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press 2005) Chapter 4. 
44 Cf. W Gekiere, R Baeten and W Palm, ‘Free Movement of Services in the EU and Health Care’, in E 
Mossialos et al. (eds), Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy 
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 461, 467.  
45 Watts, op. cit. supra note 31, para 91. 
46 E Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the European Union: Barriers to Movement in Their Constitutional 
Context (Kluwer Law International 2008) 56. 
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not deliver convincing results. It is therefore necessary to find an alternative approach which 
provides more persuasive answers. 
 
LAW AS INTEGRITY 
It is submitted that law as integrity offers a promising alternative in order to conceptualise the 
case law of the Court. Dworkin explains the character of integrity through an analogy in 
which novelists meet in order to write a chain novel. Each of the novelists involved in this 
project is responsible to write one specific section or chapter of that novel. They are only able 
to do this in a meaningful way, if they interpret the story that has been written so far.47 Their 
task but also their technique compares with the one applied by a common law judge48 who 
needs to engage with history as a consequence of the practice of stare decisis.49 The judge 
must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to 
advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of 
his own. So he must determine, according to his own judgment, what the 
earlier decisions come to, what the point or theme of the practice so far, taken 
as a whole, really is.50 
 
Looking at the problem from this perspective one question to ask is whether health 
care and education share similar historical ‘chains of law’51 and are therefore at all 
comparable to or relevant for each other in the context of integrity. The legal history 
regarding the migration of patients in EU law shows that Chapter 1 of Regulation No 3/58, 
which belonged to the first laws ever passed by what was then the European Economic 
                                                 
47 R Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’, 9 Critical Inquiry (1982) 179, 193. 
48 Dworkin applies the concept of integrity also in relation to statutory and constitutional law: Dworkin, supra n. 
13, Chapters 9 and 10. 
49 S Herschovitz, ‘Integrity and Stare Decisis’ in S Herschovitz (ed.), Exploring Law’s Empire. The 
Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin (Oxford University Press 2006) 103, 104. 
50 Dworkin, op. cit. supra note 47, 193-194. 
51 Dworkin, op. cit. supra note 13, 228. 
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Community, had already included laws regulating the cross-border movement of patients.52 
The legal basis of Regulation No 3/58 was Article 51 EEC53 (now Article 48 TFEU) whose 
aim was to facilitate the free movement of workers by providing them with social security. 
Welfare in general and health care in particular therefore constitute an ‘accessory’ to the 
internal market. Hence the law is an acknowledgement of the special nature of the free 
movement of workers with its social dimension.54 
In comparison, the legal history of education has developed differently. Originally 
there was neither any mentioning of education in the Treaty nor was education covered by 
secondary legislation.55 At first sight, it may be somehow surprising that neither primary nor 
secondary EU law deemed it necessary to bring together education and the internal market. 
Yet at the beginning of European integration the value of knowledge (Wissensgesellschaft) 
for the individual and a society was not as obvious and compelling as it is today.56 In fact, it 
was the field of agriculture – evidenced by the Common Agricultural Policy – which was 
considered to be the most prominent economic factor.57 In the light of this development it 
does not come as a surprise that the Maastricht Treaty finally included Article 126.1 TEU58 
[now Article 165.1 TFEU] which specifically addresses the issue of (higher) education.  
 The analysis seems to have reached a point where it is possible to bring together the 
different threads and provide a preliminary answer to the question which stood at the 
beginning of this first part: is health care a service provided for remuneration? Clearly the 
                                                 
52 Verordnung Nr 3/58 (EWG) vom 16. Dezember 1958 über die Soziale Sicherheit von Wanderarbeitnehmern 
(ABl 1958, 30/561, text only available in DE, FR, IT, NL) Kapitel 1. 
53 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome 25 March 1957. 
54 Cf P C de Sousa, The European Fundamental Freedoms. A Contextual Approach (Oxford University Press 
2015) 68-71. 
55 A P van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community. Cross-Border Access to Public 
Benefits (Hart Publishing 2003) 333. 
56 Cf U Beck, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity (Sage 1992; transl. by M Ritter) 46-48. 
57 A Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Cornell 
University Press 1998) 89 (Table 2.2). 
58 Treaty on European Union [1992] O.J. 191/23. 
12 
 
analysis of the legal history showed that health care has received considerable attention by the 
EU legislator already from the beginning of European integration. As suggested, one of the 
earliest pieces of secondary legislation covered aspects of cross-border movement of patients 
even if only as an accessory to and in order to improve the functioning of the internal market. 
In comparison, education (legally) had a somewhat slow(er) start than health care.59 
Therefore, it would appear – from the perspective of integrity – that a different treatment of 
education and health care is justifiable.  
 And yet, when it comes to integrity, it is not enough to simply ‘look back’ in time. It is 
also necessary to ‘look across’ and examine as to whether there exists consistency 
horizontally in relation to the relevant principles, that is, ‘across the range of the legal 
standards the community now enforces’.60 The point which therefore needs to be developed 
further in this article is whether the Court’s activity in the field of health care has created 
some incoherence with the established principles. The framework of reference which will be 
used is based on the principles of integration and coordination. Only once consistency of these 
principles is established horizontally, is it possible to have a satisfactory answer to the 
question, which is at the centre of this article: did the judges of the ECJ behave in an 
Herculean manner and read EU health care law in the best possible light? 
  
2. The Principle of Coordination 
 
The characteristic of the principle of coordination is that it preserves the substance of 
boundaries, but additionally seeks to make boundaries more permeable. One consequence of 
                                                 
59 van der Mei, op. cit. supra note 55, 340-347. 
60 Dworkin, op. cit. supra note 13, 227. 
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the preservation of boundaries is that the authority of Member States, which is to be found 
within these boundaries, remains.61 From a constitutional perspective therefore it can be 
argued that integration, which will be discussed in more detail below, is linked to sovereignty 
and the authority to act,62 whereas coordination impacts only on the autonomy, that is, the 
capacity to act.63 Coordination can be categorised into perfect and imperfect coordination. 
The cases of Pierik64 suggest that perfect coordination and integration can come rather close 
in terms of their effects.  
In the two Pierik cases the Court interpreted a predecessor version of Article 20 
Regulation No 883/2004, that is, Article 22.2 Regulation No 1408/7165 which stipulated that 
‘[t]he authorisation required … may not be refused where the treatment in question cannot be 
provided for the person concerned within the territory of the Member State in which he 
resides.’ The ECJ, when interpreting the wording of that said norm concluded that it would 
cover two scenarios: first, the treatment which is provided in the destination state is ‘more 
effective’66 than the one available in the home state. Secondly, a particular treatment is 
unavailable in the home state altogether. One consequence of the Court’s interpretation of the 
norm was that patients were given access to the best treatment available in Europe.  
                                                 
61 Cf. A Hurrell, ‘International Law and the Making and Unmaking of Boundaries’ in A Buchanan and M 
Moore (eds.), States, National, and Borders. The Ethics of Making Boundaries (Cambridge University Press 
2003) 275, 279. 
62 S Leibfried and P Pierson, ‘Semisovereign Welfare States: Social Policy in a Multitiered Europe’, in S 
Leibfried and P Pierson (eds.), European Social Policy. Between Fragmentation and Integration (The 
Brookings Institution 1995) 43, 44. 
63 Cf. K A Armstrong, Governing Social Inclusion. Europeanization through Policy Coordination (Oxford 
University Press 2010) 41. 
64 Case 117/77 Pierik, EU:C:1978:72; Case 182/78 Pierik (No 2), EU:C:1979:142. 
65 Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the Application of Social Security Schemes 
to Employed Persons and their Families Moving within the Community, English Special Edition: Series I 
Chapter 1971(II) 416.  
66 Case 117/77, Pierik, EU:C:1978:72, para 22. 
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The Court justified its interpretation of the relevant provision by arguing ‘that it was 
the intention of the regulation to give medical requirements a decisive role’.67 I do not intend 
to discuss the problems related with intentional interpretation.68 Member States responded to 
the Court’s ruling by amending Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71. They added two criteria, 
the primary aim of which was to regulate the impact the health care framework of the EU has 
on national systems. Member States clarified that authorisation to patients only has to be 
given for treatment which is ‘among the benefits provided’ (vector of treatment) and if 
provided, ‘within the time normally necessary for obtaining the treatment in question in the 
Member State of residence, taking account of his current state of health and the probable 
course of the disease’69 (vector of time). 
While secondary EU law allows for authorisation which is an essential feature of 
coordination, Article 56 TFEU stipulates that ‘[w]ithin the framework of the provisions set 
out below, restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be 
prohibited.’70 Yet even the free movement provisions of the Treaty do not entitle patients to 
exit their system of affiliation under all circumstances. Member States remain entitled to put 
in place certain restrictions of free movement law. According to Article 52 TFEU, 
derogations are possible based on public policy, public security or public health. In addition, 
the Court has developed ‘mandatory requirements’ which provide grounds of justifications in 
order to limit the free movement law.71 The difficult question that remains, however, is to 
establish what type of regulatory framework constitutes an acceptable or legitimate restriction 
on freedom?  
                                                 
67 Case 182/78, Pierik (No 2), EU:C:1979:142, para 12 (emphasis added). 
68 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 1999) Chapter 6. 
69 Article 22.2 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2793/81 of 17 September 1981 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the 
Community and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 fixing the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71.  
70 Emphasis added. 
71 D Chalmers et al., European Union Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge University Press 2014) 899-901. 
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In order to develop a legitimate balance of such a framework the Court usually draws 
on the principle of proportionality. The principle needs to address the impact the framework 
of the EU has on waiting lists and the scope of treatment. In health care it is the concept of 
solidarity which is ‘submitted to one or the other version of a proportionality test’.72 The aim 
of proportionality is to protect specifically recognised interests.73 The principle of 
proportionality is especially useful because it allows to balance ‘a liberal rights-based 
constitutional rationality with a strong commitment to a welfare state’.74 Yet the essential 
problem with the proportionality test is that the various versions of it are all based on an 
‘open-ended formula’.75 Therefore, the proportionality test is sometimes considered to simply 
conceal political decisions behind a veil of verbose, albeit substantively weak, legal 
reasoning.76 In order to establish whether the Court upheld the principle of coordination to a 
similar degree in comparison to the Regulation, the pivotal question to consider is how the 
proportionality test deals with the two critical parameters of time and treatment.  
 
THE VECTOR OF TIME 
In relation to the first parameter, that is, ‘waiting times’ the Court in Inizan77 interpreted 
Article 22.2 of Regulation No 1408/71 with reference to and in analogy with the cases 
Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms78 as well as Müller-Fauré and Van Riet;79 all of which 
addressed ‘time’ in the context of the Treaty. Advocate General Villalón in the very recent 
                                                 
72 Somek, supra n. 18, 6. 
73 G de Búrca, ‘The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law’, 13 Yearbook of European Law 
(1993) 105, 106. 
74 T-I Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in the EU’, 16 European Law Journal (2010) 158. 
75 G Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (Cambridge University Press 
2012) 218. 
76 Sousa, op. cit. supra note 54, 45. 
77 Case C-56/01, Inizan, EU:C:2003:578.  
78 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op. cit. supra note 25, para 103. 
79 Case C-385/99, Müller-Faurè and Van Riet, EU:C:2003:270, para 89. 
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case of Elchinov reasoned that since the Court repeats the same statement of law, 
irrespectively of whether it is dealing with a case based on the Treaty or the Regulation, the 
only sensible conclusion to be drawn is that it ‘[is] placing the interpretation of the Treaty and 
the interpretation of secondary law on an equal footing in case-law.’80  
Arguably, in a rather unusual way the ECJ filled the ‘open-ended formula’ of the 
proportionality test by drawing on lex specialis, i.e. Regulation, which thereby became a 
‘controlling factor’.81 Because the Court cannot rule out, as will be argued subsequently, that 
EU health care law impacts on the national systems, it fills the gaps with existing secondary 
law and thereby upholds the integrity of the law. Thus, the Court ensured that it transferred 
the principle of coordination, which is in operation in the context of the Regulation, as 
approximate as possible from the Regulation context, into the Treaty context. According to 
Article 20.2 of Regulation No 883/2004 the maximum waiting time is based on whatever is 
‘medically justifiable’ which seems however, to limit the authority of Member States. 
Yet, the question of whether a specific treatment is ‘medically justifiable’ constitutes 
no longer a problem of interpretation but, if we apply MacCormick’s framework, one of 
‘classification’.82 This finding goes beyond pure semantics because the question whether 
specific factual circumstances fit a described class, transforms a problem of interpretation 
into one of fact.83 While generally a court needs to make a decision about facts and law in 
one judgment, in the EU context we encounter a strict ‘division of functions’84 between the 
                                                 
80 A.G. Villalón, Case C-173/09, Elchinov, EU:C:2010:336, para 77; cf. also A.G. Geelhoed, C-372/04, Watts, 
EU:C:2005:784, para 101; he was followed by the Court in the subsequent judgment (paras 60-64); but see van 
der Mei writing a few years earlier (supra n. 55) 305. 
81 Conway, supra n. 75, 275. 
82 N MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law. A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford University Press 2005) 
43. 
83 Ibid., 141- 142. 
84 G Davies, ‘Activism Relocated. The Self-Restraint of the European Court of Justice in its National Context’, 
19 Journal of European Public Policy (2012) 76, 78.  
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national courts and the ECJ. This means that the ECJ at most wields the authority of 
persuasion to impose its preferences on Member States. 85  
In the Dutch case of Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms the specific treatment in question 
was not covered by national insurance rules. According to the Dutch decree on sickness 
insurance benefits in kind, medical and surgical care, the treatment provided by a general 
practitioner and a specialist is only covered if it is considered ‘normal in the professional 
circles concerned’.86 There are two ways how to interpret the word ‘normal’ in this context: it 
can be understood either with reference to the ‘national’ or alternatively ‘international’ 
medical circles.87 While the Court accepted that the phrase in question ‘[was] open to a 
number of interpretations’,88 it concluded nevertheless that it needed to be interpreted as 
‘sufficiently tried and tested by international medical science’.89 If the relevant norm were to 
be interpreted in a way that it only covers ‘treatment habitually carried out on national 
territory and scientific views prevailing in national medical circles to determine what is or is 
not normal’,90 it would be quite likely that generally Dutch providers were to be preferred. 
While the effects of the Court’s judgment seem to fall along the correct lines, its reasoning – 
based on the language of discrimination – does not persuade fully.  
A better approach seems the one chosen by Advocate General Colomer who rejects 
any of the territorial references by arguing that ‘[t]he criterion of what is normal in 
professional circles, … is determined on objective medical grounds and without regard to the 
place where the treatment is provided.’91 The gist of the reasoning of the Advocate General 
                                                 
85 Ibid., 79. 
86 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op. cit. supra note 25, para 10 (emphasis added). 
87 Ibid., paras 96-97. 
88 Ibid., para 92. 
89 Ibid, para 94 (empahsis added); also C Kopetzki, ‘Behandlung auf dem “Stand der Wissenschaft” ’ in W J 
Pfeil (ed.), Finazielle Grenzen des Behandlungsanspruches (MANZ 2010) 9, 14. 
90 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op. cit. supra note 25, para 96 (emphasis added). 
91 A.G. Colomer, op. cit. supra note 30, para 43 (emphasis added). 
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also resonates in the submission by the Dutch Government which was of the opinion, and this 
may come with little surprise, that ‘professional opinion in the Netherlands is also based on 
the state of the art and on scientific thinking at international level and depends on whether, in 
the light of the state of national and international science, the treatment is regarded as normal 
treatment’.92  One reason as to why the judges may have invoked the language of 
discrimination may be a consequence of the fact that the ECJ cannot rule on the meaning of 
national law, whereas the issue of discrimination gives them a better handle on the substance. 
 
THE VECTOR OF TREATMENT 
With regard to the second factor, scope of treatment, the Court held on more than one 
occasion that EU law ‘cannot, in principle, have the effect of requiring a Member State to 
extend such lists of medical benefits.’93 Consequently, ‘the fact that a particular type of 
medical treatment is covered or not covered by the sickness insurance schemes of other 
Member States is irrelevant in this regard’.94 Both statements of the Court suggest that the EU 
health care framework is rather deferential to national law. The Court, in Müller-Faurè and 
Van Riet, echoed this finding when it held that the ‘achievement of the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty inevitably requires Member States to make some adjustments to 
their national systems of social security. It does not follow that this would undermine their 
sovereign powers in this field.’95  
In this context the Bulgarian case of Elchinov is of interest. The Bulgarian health care 
system offers a mix between definitive lists of covered benefits but also describes what 
                                                 
92 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op. cit. supra note 25, para 93 (emphasis added). 
93 For example: Case C-173/09 Elchinov, EU:C:2010:581, para 58 (emphasis added). 
94 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op. cit. supra note 25, para 87 (emphasis added). 
95 Müller-Faurè and Van Riet, op. cit. supra note 79, para 102 (emphasis added). 
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constitutes such benefits in rather generic wording.96 Mr Elchinov, having been diagnosed 
with a malignant oncological disease, requested authorisation from the competent Bulgarian 
authority in order to receive treatment in a specialist clinic in Germany. The considerable 
advantage of the treatment in Germany was that Mr Elchinov’s eye was saved. The relevant 
section of the Bulgarian health insurance law stipulates that treatment covered by the public 
health care system includes in No 136 ‘other operations on the eyeball’ and in No 258 ‘high 
technology radiotherapy for oncological and non-oncological conditions’.  
In a preliminary ruling to the ECJ the Bulgarian national court wanted to know, 
among other things, whether the fact that this specific, less invasive, treatment offered in 
Germany, not available in Bulgaria, yet covered by Bulgarian national law, would qualify as 
‘treatment in question’ in accordance with what was then Article 22.2 of Regulation 1408/71. 
The Court in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms had already held that ‘treatment in question’ 
refers to ‘the same or equally effective treatment’.97 Consequently, if Bulgarian national law, 
as was the case in Elchinov, decides to cover less invasive treatment, arguably, the more 
‘effective treatment’ – this means that the more invasive treatment actually available in 
Bulgaria – can no longer be considered to amount to the ‘treatment in question’. Whether the 
treatment is more effective, however, is ultimately a question of fact. Thus again, this means 
that the ECJ does not have the authority to make a decision.  
Nevertheless, the Bulgarian case appears to constitute an example where an increase 
in national solidarity is required as a consequence of EU law, that is, as a consequence of the 
interpretation of what constitutes ‘treatment in question’. Yet a different, more accurate, 
interpretation of the legal practice seems to be that the Bulgarian legislator can simply adjust 
the law to its realities and remove from the list of covered treatments the wording ‘other 
                                                 
96 A.G. Villalón, op. cit. supra note 80, para 60. 
97 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op.cit. supra note 25, para 103. 
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operations on the eyeball’ and ‘high-technology radiotherapy for oncological and non-
oncological conditions’ if the health care system only intends to offer treatment which 
amounts to a complete removal of the eyeball (‘enucleation’).98 Therefore it seems obvious 
that the Bulgarian legislator has retained its authority. 
Davies has made the observation that often because of the direct application of free 
movement rights of the Treaty they can provide a useful and powerful tool for the court to 
foster integration ‘where secondary legislation does exist, but does not grant the rights 
desired’.99 At least in the field of health care this finding is not supported. In fact, the 
conclusion must be the other way around. The examples studied suggest that the Court draws 
on secondary legislation as a form of lex specialis. The Regulation covering free movement 
of patients in relation to the proportionality test in particular is used in order to interpret the 
more general law, that is, the Treaty. With regard to the integrity of law it can be concluded 
that the Court has invoked the Regulation even in the context of the Treaty and thus applies 
existing principles consistently. In other words, the degree of coordination is the same in the 
context of the Regulation and the Treaty. Finally, the discussion turns to the most 
controversial aspect of EU health care law, namely the integration of health care systems and 
the question of how this can be justified by a Herculean judge. 
 
3. The Principle of Integration 
 
                                                 
98 AP van der Mei, ‘Case C-512/08, Commission v. France, Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber) of 5 October 2010, nyr, and Case C-173/09, Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v. 
Natsionalnadravnoosiguritelna kasa, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 5 October 2010, 
nyr’ 48 Common Market Law Review (2011) 1297, 1305-1306. 
99 Davies, op. cit. supra note 11, 1602. 
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Above it has been argued above that education and health care come from a different chain of 
EU law and also that health care law coordinates, whereas education integrates systems. 
However, to the extent that the Court removes any barriers to free movement of patients, 
arguably, health care is based on the principle of integration. And yet it would appear that 
there remains a difference between integration in health care and education. Integration in 
education has abolished the boundaries of membership, whereas integration in health care has 
only abolished the functional boundaries of health care systems. Therefore it does not come 
as a surprise that that education is no longer based on the law on free movement of services 
but on non-discrimination/citizenship law, whereas health care law is still exclusively driven 
by the law on free movement of services.100  
Thus, it is still necessary to establish whether the principle of coordination can be 
accommodated with the principle of integration as developed by the Court in health care. In 
the discussion about coordination in health care, the requirement of authorisation constitutes 
a focal point because depending on its nature it can either preserve or undermine the integrity 
of existing boundaries. This in turn then either fosters or hinders integration. While 
boundaries or the ruins of them are not necessarily an absolute barrier to free movement, they 
are nevertheless an obstacle to it. It therefore comes with little surprise that the ECJ 
considered the legal requirement of prior authorisation – imposed on patients who intend to 
undergo health care treatment in another EU Member State – to constitute a restriction on 
free movement of services which can only be upheld if justifiable.101  
In this context an oddity regarding the qualification of what constitutes an obstacle to 
free movement law needs to be examined. While for some types of treatment, i.e. non-
                                                 
100 Cf A Somek, Individualism. An Essay on the Authority of the European Union (Oxford University Press 
2008) 201-204.  
101 Kohll, op. cit. supra note 8, paras 31-36.  
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hospital treatment, the Court found national laws, which require prior authorisation, to be in 
conflict with the Treaty, it refused to come to the same conclusion in relation to secondary 
EU law, i.e. Article 20.2 of Regulation 883/2004. The Court tried to justify the difference by 
arguing that Article 42 EC Treaty (now Article 48 TFEU), which is the legal basis for 
Regulation 883/2004, ‘does not prohibit the Community legislature from attaching conditions 
to the rights and advantages which it accords in order to ensure freedom of movement for 
workers.’102 Yet one would think that the requirement of prior authorisation in health care 
amounts either to a violation of the free movement principle, or it does not.103  
It appears that Cabral’s conclusion is less compelling if one analyses the matter from 
the perspective of the ‘no-impact-approximation’; by this I mean that the health care 
framework of the EU has no or rather limited impact on the national health care systems. 
Needless to say, that the nature of legal reasoning becomes now consequentialist.104 Article 
20 Regulation No 883/2004 reimburses patients in accordance with the tariffs of the Member 
State where the patient receives the treatment.105 This can create either more or fewer costs 
for the Member State of affiliation but is counterbalanced, it is submitted, by the requirement 
for authorisation. Thus Member States, it has been argued, retain formally the legal authority 
of making the decision even if their autonomy to act may in fact be rather limited because the 
terms and conditions are predetermined – to a considerable degree – by the supranational 
level.  
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THE STATE OF PARETO-EFFICIENCY 
The situation is different when it comes to the application of the Treaty. In Kohll the Court 
held that national laws which stipulate the need for prior authorisation are in conflict with the 
Treaty.106 Thus Member States have lost the formal authority to grant permission. It is 
argued, that to the extent Member States have lost the formal legal authority to decide, this 
can only be justified if the migration of patients does not violate the no-impact-
approximation. In other words, nobody is made worse off and at least one person, here the 
patient, is better off because of the Court’s intervention.107 Pareto-efficiency embodies 
another important demand of integrity, namely that a government has ‘equal concern’ for the 
treatment of its citizens.108 It may be disputed, from an empirical perspective, whether the 
case actually achieves this result but it is nevertheless important to note that both the Court 
and the Advocate General seem to make their arguments in this contextual framework. 
Clearly, Advocate General Tesauro made reference to the possible effects EU health 
care law, based on free movement of services, could have on national solidarity and found: 
‘[t]he only effect I can conceive of is that … [the] orthodontist established in the same State 
[Luxembourg] will have lost one patient. It is therefore the individual practitioners who are 
adversely affected and not the system itself.’109 The Court followed its Advocate General and 
added that ‘it is clear that reimbursement of the costs of dental treatment provided in other 
                                                 
106 Kohll, op. cit. supra note 8, para 54. 
107 Cf M Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Hart 
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108 Dworkin, op. cit. supra note 13, 222. 
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Member States in accordance with the tariff of the State of insurance has no significant effect 
on the financing of the social security system’.110 
The Court in its consequentialist reasoning in health care also acknowledged the 
necessity for an ‘overall approach’. The judges considered it to be ‘self-evident that assuming 
the cost of one isolated case of treatment, carried out in a Member State other than that in 
which a particular person is insured with a sickness fund, can never make any significant 
impact on the financing of the social security system.’111 The Court thereby seemed to pursue 
an altogether different strategy in health care in comparison to the doctrine of ‘unreasonable 
financial burden’112 which it had applied in education cases such as Baumbast113 and 
Grzelczyk.114 The obvious criticism raised against the Court then was that the micro-level 
findings were simply scaled up to the macro-level when the kernel of the problem would be 
that ‘one Baumbast and one Grzelczyk cannot really constitute an unreasonable burden upon 
the public purse – but ten-thousand Baumbasts and ten-thousand Grzelczyks might well have 
some more appreciable effect on the welfare resources of the host state.’115  
While the Court was of the opinion that free movement of patients would have no 
considerable effects on solidarity in the context of non-hospital care, it reached a different 
conclusion in relation to hospital care. The judges assumed that ‘[i]t is well known that the 
number of hospitals, their geographical distribution, the way in which they are organised and 
the facilities with which they are provided, and even the nature of the medical services which 
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they are able to offer, are all matters for which planning must be possible.’116 The Court 
consequently accepted, without the need for further detailed evidence,117 that the requirement 
of authorisation constitutes a necessary tool in order to control costs but also avoid wastage 
of resources.118  
And yet critics of the Court are nevertheless of the opinion that free movement of 
patients would amount to the ‘Killing of National Health and Insurance Systems’ or the 
‘Corroding [of] Social Solidarity.’119 The issue is important and therefore needs to be studied 
in more detail. The gist of the argument critics make is based on the planning argument. 
According to them the case law of the Court undermined Member States’ ability to assign 
resources and control costs through, e.g., the use of waiting lists.120 The Court, through its 
focus on the individual patient ignores, so argue the critics, the ‘opportunity costs’ which 
accumulate whenever limited resources are used in one way instead of another.121 The 
reasons for their scepticism may also have to do with the fact that in the real world there are 
relatively few Pareto-superior situations.122 Nevertheless, in the remainder of this Chapter it 
will be argued that their concerns appear to be unfounded for two reasons.  
 
                                                 
116 Müller-Faurè and Van Riet, op. cit. supra note 79, para 77. 
117 Cf N N Shuibhne and M Maci, ‘Proving Public Interest: The Growing Impact of Evidence in Free Movement 
Case Law’, 50 Common Market Law Review (2013) 965, 997-998. 
118 Müller-Faurè and Van Riet, op. cit. supra note 79, para 80. 
119 See for detailed references: E Szyszczak, ‘Patients’ Rights: A Lost Cause or a Missed Opportunity’, in J W 
van de Gronden et al. (eds), Health Care and EU Law (TMC Asser Press 2011) 103, 110. 
120 C Newdick, ‘Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding 
Social Solidarity’, 43 Common Market Law Review (2006) 1645, 1661-1664. 
121 C Newdick, ‘The European Court of Justice, Transnational Health Care, and Social Citizenship – Accidental 
Death of a Concept?’ 26 Wisconsin Journal of International Law (2009) 844, 865. 
122 S Guest, Ronald Dworkin 3rd ed. (Stanford University Press 2013) 151. 
26 
 
THE ANOMALY OF THE EXCEPTION 
In contrast to critics of the Court it is argued that patients, while being on a waiting list, can 
develop additional health conditions which can increase the overall ‘costs-per-patient.’ And 
yet quite possibly only some of these additional costs will exclusively affect the health care 
budget, whereas other costs will simply be externalised to other budget posts, such as 
welfare, or alternatively they are ‘privatised’, e.g. to the members of a family who takes care 
of a patient. Furthermore, poor health of a population, due to long waiting lists, can even 
have macro-economic consequences because a population becomes, for example, overall less 
productive.123 In van Riet the Court made reference especially to this point when it argued 
that ‘the degree of pain or the nature of the patient’s disability … might, for example, make it 
impossible or extremely difficult for him [the patient] to carry out a professional activity’.124  
Without developing these points fully, this much is obvious: if one does not take 
adequately into account the costs of waiting lists, this necessarily distorts the findings made 
in relation to opportunity costs. Consequently not each and every shortening of waiting lists 
necessarily amounts to increased costs of a health care system. And yet, there obviously 
comes a point, however difficult to locate, where a health care system with longer waiting 
times is cheaper to run in comparison with a system that operates with shorter waiting lists. It 
is then that the no-impact-approximation, as outlined above, is violated because Member 
States find themselves in a situation in which unless they pour more funds into the system – 
which increases the quantity of solidarity – some other patients will have to live with 
extended waiting times and this will impact on their welfare. 
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A different way of looking at the same issue would be that there comes a point where 
EU health care law has used up all its ‘efficiency-savings’ which means that either more 
solidarity is needed or EU health care law is beginning to have an impact on how national 
health care systems have to be  managed. The probability for this scenario to happen 
increases the broader the anomaly of integration is defined. The rarity of Pareto-superior 
circumstances may have been one contributing factor for the Court to decide upon abolishing 
the requirement of prior authorisation only in relation to non-hospital treatment.125 This 
marks the second reason as to why the argument of the critics is of limited persuasiveness. It 
would appear that the conceptual approach of the Court upholds the idea of equality, namely, 
that the rights of those who wish to exit are not taken more seriously by the ECJ than those 
who do not.126 
However, one obvious consequence of the Court’s case law was that it became 
necessary to distinguish between hospital care and non-hospital care which is, however, 
difficult to do at times. The Court drew the following line: ‘certain services provided in a 
hospital environment but also capable of being provided by a practitioner in his surgery or in 
a health centre could for that reason be placed on the same footing as non-hospital 
services.’127 This approach suggests, without offering absolute clarity, that the decisive 
criterion regarding hospital treatment did not necessarily depend on where the treatment took 
place but where the treatment could have taken place.  
The new Directive 2011/24, which regulates aspects of cross-border movement of 
patients, continues to distinguish between treatment for which prior authorisation is 
imperative and treatment for which no authorisation is needed. According to Article 8.2 of 
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the Directive the requirement of prior authorisation may be ‘limited’ (which could be 
understood as a cynical choice of word) to treatment which ‘involves overnight hospital 
accommodation of the patient in question for at least one night’ or (alternatively) which 
‘requires use of highly specialised and cost-intensive medical infrastructure or medical 
equipment.’ To what extent this second aspect leaves room for interpretation can be seen if 
one compares the Opinions of the Advocate Generals Bot and Sharpston in the cases 
Hartlauer128 and Commission v France.129  
In Hartlauer, Advocate General Bot chose a rather extensive reading of hospital 
treatment. He considered even dental care, if it goes beyond most basic care (e.g. plaque 
control or polishing) and requires some qualified staff,130 to amount to hospital treatment. In 
turn, for Advocate General Sharpston the decisive parameter whether a certain treatment 
qualifies as hospital treatment or not depends on the costs of the equipment involved in the 
treatment.131 Clearly, Advocate General Sharpston seems to prefer a slightly narrower 
understanding of what constitutes hospital treatment if compared to Advocate General Bot. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to notice a tendency that has developed over time which appears 
to limit the circumstances when a patient is entitled to treatment in another Member State 
without the need for authorisation.132 Overall Advocate General Sharpston’s cost-focussed 
approach appears to be conceptually preferable because it is in line with the no-impact 
approximation and the Court seems to follow.133 Overall it seems that the anomaly of 
integration created by the Court has been gradually reduced in its scope.  
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To conclude: the abolition of the authorisation mechanism constitutes an anomaly 
which has led to the integration of health care systems by abolishing functional boundaries. 
However, in contrast to education, in health care the membership boundaries have remained 
intact. The relationship between the coordination and integration in health care can be 
accommodated with the no-impact-approximation: the framework of the EU work must not 
have any (significant) impact on the quantity of national solidarity. The narrowing down or 
fine tuning of the anomaly of integration in the Court’s case law is an acknowledgement of 
the difficulties to firmly establish, that is, beyond pure speculation, to what extent integration 
of health care systems has an effect on national solidarity. The Court thereby operates with 
the following approximation: the cheaper the treatment involved in cross-border health care, 





Over the last decade or so the law on cross-border movement of patients has gained some 
momentum. One critical factor in this development has been the Court. The interpretation of 
the law on the free movement of services resulted in its application in the field of migration 
of patients. In reaction to its jurisprudence the Court has faced some considerable criticism 
over the years. The aim of this article was therefore to undertake a (re-)appraisal of this 
criticism through an in-depth conceptual analysis of the Court’s legal reasoning. The 
approach chosen for this article was based on Dworkin’s conceptual idea which treats law as 
integrity. Consequently it was necessary to examine and accommodate the ‘consistency’ of 
the Court’s treatment of the education cases in relation to health care. Furthermore, it became 
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also necessary to examine the consistency of the two strands of health care law, namely 
secondary EU law, here in particular Regulation 883/2004, and the case law which is based 
on the Treaty.  
The argument made was that there are no conflicting principles at work between 
health care and education. In contrast to health care, and based on vertical consistency, 
education was not an area which was regulated in some way by EU law. This is very much in 
contrast to health care which was considered important for the functioning of the internal 
market and also suggests that free movement of people is somewhat different from the other 
free movement laws. It is a relatively recent development that education, broadly understood, 
is important for the functioning of the internal market. However, the consequence of this 
observation is that the chains of law in health care and education are different in their 
character and the law on education does not predetermine the ‘fit’ for health care.  
The other dimension, that is, horizontal consistency, was established between the 
principles upheld by the Regulation and those of the Treaty. The Court applied the ‘open-
ended-formula’ of the proportionality test in a rather unusual way. As such the Court filled 
the vague terms of the proportionality test with the relevant provisions of Regulation 
883/2004. In this way the Court made sure to achieve the correct level of 
restriction/coordination between the different health care systems and consequently achieved 
horizontal consistency. To the extent the Court abolished boundaries through free movement 
of services and integrated systems it did so in a rather limited way. Despite the fact that the 
Court integrated systems, which would normally mean that Member states lose their 
authority, it only allowed this to the extent that circumstances change from Pareto-inefficient 
to Pareto-efficient. Thus, even if the judges of the ECJ sit in rather mundane Luxembourg 
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and not on top of the more glamorous mount Olympus, overall, they seem to follow 
Hercules’ method of interpretation in the field of health care.  
